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Abstract 
We  present  a structural  dynamic  non-linear  model  for  an  efficient  contracting  between  a 
firm  facing  adjustment  costs  on  labour  and  a union  having  preferences  which  are  subject  to 
habit  formation.  The  model’s  first-order  necessary  conditions  are  estimated  for  the  French, 
the  Dutch  and  the  Belgian  labour  market.  The  estimation  results  turned  out  to  be 
remarkably  similar  for  the  three  countries.  Two  alternative  hypotheses  are  also  investigated: 
ti)  a  myopic  behaviour  of  the  union  and  (ii)  a competitive  labour  market.  The  performance 
of  the  efficient  contract  model  with  a forward-looking  union  is  found  to  be  superior  to  that 
of  the  neoclassical  model  in  explaining  the  dynamics  of  employment  and  wages  in  the 
three  countries. 
.iEL  c  fussijication:  E24 
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1. Introduction 
The  modelling  of  wage-setting  and  employment  decisions  under  unionism  is  at 
the  center  of  the  debate  about  the  unemployment  dynamics  in  European  countries. 
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In  particular,  the  debate  on  the  role  of  unions  is  tightly  linked  to  both  the  structure 
and  the  contents  of  the  assumed  bargaining  process  and  to  the  union  preferences 
(do  unions  put  enough  weight  on  employment  decisions?).  The  empirical  literature 
has  tried  to  test  whether  observed  wage-employment  outcomes  are  consistent  with 
non-cooperative  bargaining  (starting  with  Dunlop  (1944))  or  cooperative  bargain- 
ing  (efficient  bargaining,  Leontief  (1946)).  Th ese  tests  basically  amount  to  measur- 
ing  alternative  wages  and  other  variables  affecting  the  union  utility  function 
without  directly  affecting  the  firm’s  profits,  and  their  explanatory  power  with 
respect  to  employment  in  addition  to  current  market  wages.  When  these  variables 
have  explanatory  power,  firms  are  assumed  to  stay  no  longer  on  their  labour 
demand  curves,  giving  some  support  to  the  efficient  bargaining  framework. 
Examples  are  given  in  Alogoskoufis  and  Manning  (1991)  Bean  and  Turnbull 
(1988)  Brown  and  Ashenfelter  (1986)  and  MaCurdy  and  Pencavel  (1986).  These 
studies  rely  on  the  estimation  of  one  equation  (a  labour  demand  equation  or  a 
contract  curve  equation)  derived  from  static  (one-period)  models  of  bargaining.  In 
reality,  of  course,  the  sequence  of  bargains  is  not  independent  through  time. 
Nickel1  and  Wadhwani  (1991)  who  derive  a  static  bargaining  model  and  add 
dynamics  in  an  informal  manner  to account  for  the  autocorrelation  in  the  firm-level 
panel  data  they  use,  remark:  “The  theoretical  analysis  of  such  interconnected 
bargaining  sequences  is  in  its  infancy”  (Nickel1  and  Wadhwani,  1991,  p.  960). 
A  major  criticism  of  static  efficient  bargaining  models  is  that  they  are  time-in- 
consistent.  In  the  absence  of  a legal  enforcement  procedure,  firms  always  have  an 
incentive  to  deviate  from  the  contractual  employment  level  to  return  on  their 
labour  demand  curves.  When  dynamic  aspects  are  introduced,  an  opportunity 
exists  for  the  agents  to build  a long-term  relationship  that  may  result  in  an  efficient 
outcome.  The  conditions  under  which  the  efficient  outcome  emerges  from  a 
repeated  bargaining  game  are  derived  in  simple  set-ups  by  Espinoza  and  Rhee 
(1989)  and  Strand  (1989).  Basically,  if  the  time  preference  parameters  of  the 
agents  are  high  enough,  the  future  consequences  of  any  deviation  from  the  contract 
(punishment  etc.)  have  more  weight  than  the  instantaneous  benefit  from  deviating 
from  cooperation.  Cooperative  outcomes  are  therefore  time-consistent  if  the 
agents’  discount  rates  are  high  enough. 
The  literature  on  wage  formation  in  an  intertemporal  framework  considers 
different  ways  of  introducing  dynamic  aspects  in  wage  formation.  The  most 
well-known  assumes  that  the  dynamics  arise  from  endogenous  union  membership 
(see  e.g.  Lindbeck  and  Snower,  1988).  Another  interesting  route  is  to  make  the 
link  between  explicit  wage  bargaining  and  the  literature  on  staggered  contracts 
(see  Manning,  1989).  Such  a framework  provides  the  foundations  to  the  model  of 
Taylor  (1979)  and  is  able  to  take  into  account  the  observed  sluggishness  of  wage 
series. 
In  this  paper  we  estimate  and  test  a two-equation  dynamic  model  describing  the 
optimal  paths  for  both  wages  and  employment.  The  bivariate  system  is  derived 
from  an  intertemporal  structural  model  under  uncertainty  embedding  the  coopera- tive  bargaining  framework  as  well  as  the  neo-classical  labour  demand  framework. 
We  model  wage  dynamics  as follows:  The  fact  that  European  wages  display  strong 
downward  rigidity  is  explained  in  terms  of  habit  formation.  The  utility  of  the 
union  depends  on  the  history  of  wages,  making  an  income  cut  undesirable  to  the 
union.  Stated  differently,  the  unions’  utility  function  depends  on  the  growth  of 
wages,  i.e.,  the  level  of  past  wages  is  progressively  included  in  the  reservation 
wage.  Habit  formation  relates  to  ‘built-in’  taste  changes  depending  on  past 
decisions  (compare  Boyer  (1983)  who  assumes  that  taste  changes  depend  on  past 
real  expenditure  levels).  ’  A  related  interesting  problem  in  the  context  of  habit 
formation  is  to  try  capture  the  degree  of  forward  looking  behaviour  of  the  union 
(see  Pashardes  (1986))  for  a  similar  discussion  concerning  consumption  theory). 
The  union  will  be  called  myopic  if  in  each  period  it  takes  into  account  its  wage 
history  but  does  not  recognise  the  impact  of  its  present  wage  on  its  future  tastes 
and  employment  decisions.  In  contrast,  a  ‘rational’  union  refers  to one  which  takes 
into  account  the  effect  of  its  current  decision  on  its  future  tastes. 
The  fact  that  wages  obey  to  a dynamic  decision  rule  may  affect  the  dynamics  01 
employment.  In  standard  labour  demand  models,  the  employment  dynamics  arise 
from  adjustment  costs  of  changes  in  the  workforce.  In  order  to  get  a  more  precise 
idea  on  whether  introducing  wage  dynamics  in  the  employment  equation  affects 
the  estimation  of  the  adjustment  cost  function,  we  will  start  with  a  fairly  general 
function  borrowed  from  Pfann  and  Palm  (1993)  allowing  for  asymmetric  effects.  ’ 
The  problem  of testing  the  nature  of the  bargaining  process  (i.e.  right-to-manage 
bargaining  against  efficient  bargaining)  in  a  dynamic  framework  is  far  more 
complex  than  in  the  static  model  since  “in  a  dynamic  model,  in  general  all 
variables  affecting  profits,  union  utility  and  union  power  intluence  the  employ- 
ment  equation,  even  though  the  employer  has  unilateral  control  over  employment. 
This  is  because  of  the  strategic  aspects  which  become  important  in  a  dynamic 
model.  When  choosing  current  employment  the  employer  must  take  account  of  the 
effect  of  future  wages  and  this  effect  is  influenced  by  variables  in  the  union  utility 
function  and  union  power”  (L oc k wood  and  Manning.  1989).  In  general,  there  is 
no  closed  form  solution  for  this  effect,  making  the  estimation  of  dynamic 
right-to-manage  models  almost  impossible  without  strong  assumptions  (for  in- 
stance.  Machin  et  al.  (1993)  simply  assume  that  the  effect  of  current  employment 
’ The  assumption  that  “A  once  and  for  all  increase  tends  after  a  period  to  be  forgotten  and  assumed 
part  of  the  accepted  wage  structure”  is  also  present  in  Kotowitz  and  Panes  (I 973).  Frank  and  Hutchens 
( 1993)  offer  empirical  evidence  that  people  prefer  jobs  with  rising  wage  profiles. 
’ An  additional  implication  of  adjustment  costs  in  an  efficient  contracts  model  is  that  it  makes  any 
deviation  from  the  cooperative  outcome  more  costly.  This  is  due  to  the  reduction  of  the  first-period 
firm’s  gain  of  returning  to  its  labour  demand  curve.  Hence.  adjustment  costs  of  labour  make  the 
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on  future  wages  is  a  function  of  union  presence).  This  explains  why  the  literature 
concerned  with  testing  dynamic  bargaining  models  is  so  scarce.  3 
In  an  attempt  to  tackle  the  problems  due  to  the  dynamic  features  of  the 
decision-making  and  the  underlying  identification  problems,  we  make  specific 
assumptions  about  the  shape  of  technology  and  preferences.  We  jointly  estimate 
the  employment  and  the  wage  equation  imposing  adequate  cross-equation  restric- 
tions,  and  test  the  model  as  a  whole.  The  model  includes  the  neo-classical  labour 
market  model  as a special  case.  This  implies  that,  like  Osano  and  Inoue  (1991)  and 
Card  (1986)  we  are  able  to  test  the  efficient  contract  model  against  the  neo-classi- 
cal  model. 
The  contribution  of  the  paper  is  threefold.  First,  an  intertemporal  efficient 
bargaining  model  with  asymmetric  adjustment  costs  for  labour  and  habit  formation 
of  the  form  of  built-in  taste  changes  in  the  union’s  utility  function  is  developed. 
Second,  the  model  is  estimated  for  Belgium,  France  and  the  Netherlands.  The 
model  is  found  to  perform  remarkably  well  and  yields  very  similar  estimation 
results  for  the  three  different  data  sets.  The  asymmetry  in  the  adjustment  costs  and 
habit  formation  on  the  side  of the  unions  are  highly  significant.  Third,  the  model  is 
compared  with  the  neo-classical  model  which  can  be  seen  as  a special  case  of  the 
efficient  contract  model  with  wages  equal  to  the  disutility  of  work  in  the  case  of 
unemployment.  The  performance  of  the  efficient  contract  model  is  found  to  be 
superior  to  that  of  the  neo-classical  model.  These  remarkably  robust  findings  for 
the  three  countries  under  consideration  are  interesting  for  their  own  sake,  in 
particular  for  understanding  the  sluggish  adjustment  of  wages  and  employment  in 
response  to  changes  in  the  economic  conditions  faced  by  firms.  They  are  also 
useful  as  a  guidance  for  future  research  on  wage  formation  and  employment 
decisions. 
The  structure  of  the  paper  is  as  follows:  The  dynamic  contract  model  is  derived 
in  Section  2.  Section  3  includes  the  presentation  of  the  three  data  sets,  the  GMM 
estimates  of  the  Euler  equations  of  the  model  and  a  comparison  with  the 
neo-classical  model.  Section  4  concludes. 
2.  A  dynamic  model  for  wages  and  employment 
The  objective  of  the  union-firm  tandem  is  to  maximize  a  weighted  sum  of  the 
present  value  of  utility  of  the  union  and  real  profits  of  the  firm  over  an  infinite 
3  An  interesting  alternative  is to  simulate  a fully  specified  dynamic  game  and  to  analyse  under  which 
conditions  it  is  optimal  for  the  agents  to  stick  to  the  cooperative  outcome  (or  to  return  to  the 
non-cooperative  outcome).  This  is  done  for  instance  by  Eberwein  and  Kollintzas  (1995)  in a framework 
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time  horizon,  given  all  currently  available  information.  An  optimal  contract  at time 
t  over  wages  W,  and  employment  1,  is  given  by  the  solution  of  the  following 
optimization  problem: 
+f:(y,~(l,)-~v:l,-~~(Al,))T;‘~‘l~1,  .\  =  f  1 
(1) 
with  ,_L> 0,  0 <  0, <  1,  0 <  7, <  1, 
where  Al,, = l,s  -  I,$_ ,.  p  is  the  parameter  which  weights  the  utility  of the  union  in 
the  objective  function  and  is  called  ‘union  power’.  U  is  the  utility  derived  at  time 
s  from  having  I,, workers  receiving  a real  net  wage  of  w,“. 0,  is the  discount  factor 
of  the  union.  The  second  term  on  the  right-hand  side  of  ( 1) is  the  profit  made  at 
time  s  by  producing  Y,~  using  1,  workers,  each  of  them  costing  w:.  Adjustment 
costs  being  a  function  of  Al,,  are  given  by  the  function  y,.  T,~ is  the  discount 
factor  of  the  firm.  The  discount  factors  vary  through  time.  0,  is  the  information 
set  at  time  t. 
The  relations  between  nominal  wages  w,,  net  real  wages  \v,” and  real  wage-cost 
w,~ are  given  by: 
where  c,  is  the  employer’s  social  security  contribution  rate,  p,  is  the  producer 
price,  t,  is  the  income  tax  rate  (including  employee’s  social  security  contribution) 
and  I):‘  is  the  consumer  price  index,  which  is  the  appropriate  deflator  for  the 
union.  The  tax  and  price  wedge  ;,  is  given  by 
w:  (1  +  CT) p: 
.’  5  M:  11  ( 1 -  t.,  ) P., 
The  utility  of  the  union  has  the  following  two  characteristics:  First,  following 
many  others,  we  have  chosen  a  Stone-Geary  utility  function  of  the  form 
(i,(l,.h::.w,:~,)=l,~[ly:l-W~(W:I-,)]~~,  v<  I. 
V 
where  v  is  a  measure  of  the  concavity  of  the  function  with  respect  to  the  gap 
between  net  wages  and  the  reservation  wage  72,. Notice  that  the  model  could  be 
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allowing  thereby  for  a  more  general  habit  formation  process.  This  possibility  will 
not  be  explored  here. 
Second,  we  introduce  habit  formation  in  the  model  through  ‘built-in’  taste 
changes  related  to  previous  wages.  This  implies  that  at  time  s  the  utility  function 
depends  on  wages,  employment  and  previous  wages:  U, =  q,(1,,  w,“, w,“_  , > with 
~?c/,/~?w,“_, <  0.  More  specifically,  the  reservation  wage  becomes  a  weighted 
average  of  previous  and  alternative  wages: 
The  parameter  4  measures  the  intensity  of  habit  formation.  If  4  =  0  there  is  no 
effect  of  previous  wages  on  the  tastes  through  the  disutility  of  work.  ii,  is  a 
function  of  the  alternative  wage  wp (minimum  wage  or  unemployment  allowance) 
and  of  a deterministic  trend  T,: 
Following  Pfann  and  Palm  (1993)  we  approximate  the  production  function  by  a 
quadratic  expression  in  labour  and  capital.  The  corresponding  marginal  productiv- 
ity  of  labour  can  be  written 
2=*  +Al.+h.k.+E 
alY  O 
I  \  ,!  \  0  A,>O,  A,<O,  h,>O. 
The  parameter  h,  is  assumed  to  be  negative  (decreasing  marginal  productivity) 
and  if  h,  is positive,  capital  and  labour  are  substitutes.  k,, denotes  the  capital  stock 
and  E,~  denotes  the  impact  of random  technological  shocks  on  the  production  level. 
Asymmetric  adjustment  costs  functions  in  which  hiring  costs  and  firing  costs 
are  different  have  turned  out  to  be  appropriate  to  describe  employment  dynamics. 
We  assume  a  fairly  general  function  in  which  adjustment  costs  depend  on  the 
gross  changes  of  employment,  allowing  for  asymmetric  effects  and  quit  rates, 
which  takes  the  following  form: 
Yv(  Al,)  = -  1 + exp{  PC  Al, + a)) - P(4  + s,,> 
+  r-P2 
~  ( Al, + d2. 
2 
where  q,y denotes  the  quit  rate.  If  the  parameter  p  is  negative,  firing  costs  exceed 
hiring  costs.  If  j3  is  positive,  this  inequality  is  reversed.  If  p  is  zero,  we  retrieve 
the  standard  quadratic  adjustment  cost  function,  with  y >  0  measuring  the  magni- 
tude  of  the  costs.  If  the  quit  rate  q,,  is  zero,  the  adjustment  cost  function  has  its 
minimum  at  zero  net  employment  changes.  More  generally,  it  has  its  minimum  at 
Al,  =  -4,. Wages  and  employment  negotiated  at  time  s  should  satisfy  the  Euler  equations 
associated  with  the  optimal  program  in  (I ): 
-  w; -  T<’ +  T,  E [ ?lf,‘+  , I ii?,] , 
where 
‘Y=(Y-P’)(A~,+~,)  +P-Pexp{P(Al,+y,)). 
After  substitution  of  the  realised  values  for  the  unobserved  future  expectations, 
the  Euler  equations  become: 
“=*,,+h,l,+A,k,+L[Mi:‘-~w:_,-(1-~)17,]” 
V 




I  ( ’ -  f,+ I) P: 
-4e,  &+,[w:+,-44-(1  -wJ'-  (,  _)@ 
f  ,+  I 1  +  77:;  I  3 
(7) 
with 
7’  r+  I =E,+T,[(Y-p*)Al,+, +Pexp{D(Al,+,  t-q,+,)]] 
-T,E[(Y-B*)A~+, +texp(W,+,  +tl+l~~l~~,l~ 
77”  I  ,  (1 -t,+,)K 
,+  I  =4e,  l,+,[w::, -+w:‘-(1  -w,+,ll'-  (,  _)$ 
i  r+  I  1 
,  ( 1  -  f,  4~ I > P,’ 
~,+,[~J:+,-~~~‘:l-(l--)~,+,]“-  (,  _r),,;,,  In, 
I  1 
Under  the  assumption  of  rational  expectations,  the  conditional  expectations  of 
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The  first  equation  of  (7)  says  that  the  marginal  productivity  of  labour  plus  the 
marginal  gain  in  utility  of  increasing  employment  weighted  by  union  power  should 
equal  the  wage  cost  plus  the  marginal  adjustment  cost.  The  marginal  adjustment 
cost  is  equal  to  the  cost  of  changing  employment  at  time  s  minus  the  gain  of  the 
today’s  change  on  the  cost  in  the  next  period.  The  dynamics  of  this  equation 
comprises  of  two  factors:  (i)  the  presence  of  adjustment  cost  forces  the  firm  to 
smooth  the  changes  in  employment;  (ii)  the  presence  of  habit  formation  in  union 
behaviour  makes  employment  partly  dependent  on  the  growth  of  net  wages  in  the 
past. 
According  to  the  second  equation,  the  marginal  gain  in  utility  of  increasing  the 
wage  today  should  be  equal  to  the  loss  in  profits  today  plus  the  marginal  loss  of 
utility  tomorrow.  The  dynamics  of  this  equation  is  both  backward  and  forward- 
looking;  it  is  backward-looking  because  of  the  presence  of  the  habit  formation.  It 
is forward-looking  because  the  union  recognises  the  impact  of its  current  decisions 
on  decision  variables  in  the  future.  For  instance,  wage  increases  today  will  make  it 
claim  higher  wages  in  the  next  period  as  well. 
Four  interesting  specifications  are  nested  in  system  (7).  The  first  one  refers  to 
the  neo-classical  model  and  can  be  found  as  a limit  case  when  p  =  0.  In  this  case, 
system  (7)  becomes 
i 
0 -  A, +  A,/,  +  A, k,  -  w;  -  !P>’  +  T,?P~‘+,  +  $+  , , 
o=w:l-~w:_,-(l-~)ii,+rl:+,. 
The  first  equation  is  a  standard  dynamic  labour  demand  Euler  equation.  The 
second  one  simply  says  that  wages  should  equal  the  disutility  of  work  in  the  case 
of  unemployment.  Note  that,  in  this  case,  the  parameter  v  is  no  longer  identified. 
A  second  interesting  restriction  to  test  is  19~  =  0,  Vs.  In  this  case,  the  union  is 
only  interested  in  its  contemporaneous  utility  and  does  not  take  into  account  the 
effect  of  its  current  decision  on  its  future  tastes.  In  the  myopic  union  scenario,  the 
first  Euler  equation  of  (7)  remains  unchanged  and  the  second  simply  states  that  the 
marginal  gain  in  instantaneous  utility  should  be  equal  to  the  loss  in  profits 
(weighted  by  l/p): 
o=[w:-  +w:_,-(l-+)&]“-‘-;. 
A  third  interesting  restriction  is  C$  =  0.  In  this  case,  the  union  is  not  subject  to 
habit  formation  and  the  second  equation  of  (7)  is  reduced  to 
In  this  case,  the  real  wage  is  equal  to  the  disutility  of  work  plus  a  positive  term 
related  to  union  power  and  the  wedge.  It  does  not  depend  on  the  level  of 
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to  the  one  of  the  shocks  themselves)  than  the  general  model,  as  stressed  in  de  la 
Croix  and  Fagnart  ( 1995). 
A  last  restriction  to  test  is  4  =  1. If  4  equals  one.  the  union  is  only  interested 
in  wage  growth.  Its  utility  function  becomes 
u, =$[dw:‘]‘,  subject  to  4~:  2  0; 
system  (7)  now  becomes 
i 
0=i,[4W:l]“~‘-~-0,s  /,+,[dw:+,]I’~ 
[  ,  (]  -f,+,)P:‘  (]-‘,)&  +%?I.  1 
In  this  case,  any  temporary  shock  will  have  permanent  effects  on  the  level  01 
wages  as  the  equation  explains  first  differences  of  w,,” instead  of  levels. 
In  the  next  section,  the  efficient  contract  model  will  be  estimated  from  data  for 
Belgium,  France  and  the  Netherlands.  The  special  cases  of  the  model  described 
above  will  be  empirically  investigated  as  well. 
3.  Estimation  of  the  model 
For  the  empirical  analysis  we  use  three  different  data  sets: 
-  French  data  are  quarterly  macroeconomic  data  from  1963.1  to  1991 .IV.  Em- 
ployment  is  measured  in  terms  of hours  worked.  The  chosen  alternative  wage  is 
the  legal  minimum  wage  (SMIC)  which  is  an  important  tool  of  the  social  and 
income  policy  of  the  government. 
-  Dutch  data  are  quarterly  sectoral  data  from  197 1  .I  to  1989.W  covering  the 
manufacturing  sector.  Employment  is  measured  in  terms  of  hours.  The  tax 
wedge  and  alternative  wage  data  are  annual  data  from  Graafland  (1991)  and 
have  been  interpolated  using  an  autonomic  procedure.  ’  The  alternative  wage  is 
the  government  assistance  to  the  long-term  unemployed. 
*  Belgian  data  are  annual  macroeconomic  data  from  1953  to  1988.  Employment 
is  measured  in  terms  of  numbers  of  workers  (corrected  for  part-time  jobs).  The 
alternative  wage  is  the  average  unemployment  allowance. 
The  sources  and  exact  definitions  of  the  variables  are  presented  in  an  appendix. 
The  employment  series  are  plotted  in  Fig.  1. For  the  three  countries,  employment 
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Fig.  I. Employment  levels. 
exhibits  a  steep  decrease  since  the  beginning  of  the  seventies,  followed  by  an 
increase  in  the  second  half  of  the  eighties  in  Belgium  and  France  and  a  stabiliza- 
tion  in  the  Netherlands. 
The  heterogeneity  of  there  three  data  sets  has  an  important  drawback.  It  limits 
the  scope  of  relevant  cross-country  comparisons  of  the  estimated  parameters. 
However,  the  attractiveness  of  such  an  heterogeneity  is to  investigate  the  appropri- 
ateness  and  robustness  of  the  model  when  it  is  applied  to  different  economies.  5 
Two  problems  arise  when  estimating  the  system  (7).  First,  there  is  a correlation 
between  the  endogenous  variables  at  time  t +  1 like  1,+,  and  w,!‘,  ,  and  the  error 
terms  q,“, ,  and  r]:,  1. For  this  reason  we  need  to  instrument  these  variables  to 
obtain  consistent  estimates  of  the  parameters.  Second,  the  error  terms  have  a 
moving  average  representation  of  order  one,  implying  that  the  nonlinear  three- 
stage-least-squares  estimation  of  the  covariance  matrix  of  the  parameters  is  not 
appropriate.  For  these  reasons,  it  is  preferable  to  use  the  general  method  of 
moments  proposed  by  Hansen  (1982)  which  is  based  on  the  fact  that  the 
conditional  expectation  of  the  Euler  equation  error  should  be  zero  when  evaluated 
at the  true  parameter  value  (see  Eq.  (8)).  Writing  p  *  for  the  true  values  of the  set 
of  parameters  /3, Eq.  (8)  implies  that 
5 The  use  of  aggregate  or  sectoral  data  to  analyze  dynamic  models  of  the  (representative)  firm  has 
met  severe  critics  recently  (cf.  Hamermesh,  1993).  In  the  three  countries  that  we  consider,  for  the  time 
period  that  we  look  at,  however,  negotiations  took  place  at  the  sectoral  or  aggregate  level.  In  this  case, 
the  empirical  analysis  of  the  dynamic  processes  of  the  decision  variables  1 and  w  with  firm-specific 
pane1  data  requires  not  only  many  waves  but  also  a  structural  model  where  decisions  are  made  in  two 
consecutive  stages.  The  (first)  bargaining  stage  models  the  contract  negotiations  at  the  aggregate  level. 
The  firm  specific  (second)  decision  stage  models  the  impact  of  the  outcomes  from  the  first  stage  on  the 
firm  specific  decision  process  of  1 and  W. (see  also  Machin  et  al.  (1993)).  In  this  paper,  because  of  a 
lack  of  sufficiently  long  time  series  on  firm  level  data,  we  merge  the  two  stages  into  one  and  analyze 
wage  and  employment  decisions  at  the  macroeconomic  or  sectoral  level. D. de  la Croix  et al. /European  Economic  Reuiew 40  (I 996)  429-448  ‘I39 
Table  I 
The  efficient  contract  model  (estimates) 
France 
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0.63 
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where  0,  is  the  vector  of  variables  included  in  the  information  set.  Defining 
G(  p ) as  the  sample  average  of  (v:+  ,( p>,  qrMJ_  ,( p ))’ @ 0,)  GMM  minimizes 
G(  P>‘WG(  PI, 
where  W  is  the  optimal  weighting  matrix  computed  using  3SLS  estimates  of  p  * . 
When  the  model  is  overidentified,  GMM  can  be  seen  as  an  application  of 
instrumental  variable  estimation  which  uses  the  residuals  from  the  non-linear 
3SLS  estimation  to  compute  a consistent  estimate  of  the  covariance  matrix  of  the 
parameters. 
Given  that  the  error  term  of  the  Euler  equations  follows  a  vector  MA(l) 
process,  two  period  lagged  instrumental  variables  are,  by  assumption,  orthogonal 
to  the  error  process.  The  list  of  instruments  is  given  in  appendix  together  with  the 
description  of  the  data.  Following  Shapiro  (1986),  the  discount  rate  rs  varies  over 
time,  being  the  inverse  of  one  plus  the  long-term  real  interest  rate.  We  have  no 
unbiased  reason  to  assume  a different  discount  rate  for  the  union,  so  0,, has  been 
set  equal  to  7,.  Since  there  are  no  consistent  data  on  q,,  for  the  three  countries 
under  consideration,  qs  has  been  assumed  constant  through  time.  The  estimation 
of  q,  turned  out  to  be  difficult  because  qs  is  only  weakly  identified  in  (7).  We 
have  chosen  q,y on  the  basis  of  a grid  search  by  minimizing  G(  /3 )’ WG(  /3 ) under 
the  constraint  that  the  adjustment  cost  function  should  be  convex.  This  gives  the 
following  values  for  the  quit  rates:  0.01  for  France,  0.025  for  the  Netherlands  and 
0.03  for  Belgium. 
The  estimation  results  are  given  in  Table  1. ’  Table  3  reports  various  tests 
6 Standard-errors  are  between  brackets.  They  are  computed  from  the  heteroscedastic  and  autocorrela- 
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Fig.  2.  Adjustment  costs  functions 
including  Hansen’s  J-test  for  the  overidentifying  restrictions  in  the  orthogonality 
conditions. 
The  estimation  results  show  that  all  parameters  are  significantly  different  from 
zero  (with  the  exception  of  h,  for  Belgium)  and  have  the  expected  sign. 
Moreover,  despite  the  differences  between  the  countries  and  the  type  of  data  used, 
the  results  exhibit  remarkable  cross-country  similarities.  As  pointed  out  above,  a 
negative  estimate  for  /3  indicates  that  firing  costs  exceed  hiring  costs  in  all  three 
countries.  The  parameter  p  is  highly  significant,  a  finding  which  stresses  the 
importance  of  asymmetries  in  the  three  data  sets.  The  adjustment  costs  functions 
using  the  point  estimates  of  p  and  y  are  shown  in  Fig.  2. 
The  parameter  4  of  habit  formation  is  0.74  and  0.81  for  quarterly  data  of 
France  and  the  Netherlands  respectively  and  0.58  for  annual  Belgian  data.  For  the 
three  data  sets  it  is  significantly  different  from  one  on  the  basis  of  a conventional 
t-test.  Both  the  trend  (u,)  and  the  alternative  wage  (I*,)  have  a  significant  impact 
on  the  reservation  wage.  The  cross-country  differences  in  U,  partly  reflect  the 
differences  in  the  alternative  wage  which  we  have  chosen  (minimum  wage  for 
France,  long-term  unemployment  allowance  for  the  Netherlands  and  average 
unemployment  allowance  for  Belgium).  The  parameter  v  is  accurately  estimated 
with  values  between  0.69  and  0.89.  These  values  are  not  inconsistent  with  the 
previous  studies  on  unions’  objectives  carried  out  with  static  models,  as  reported 
by  Pencavel  (1991).  Indeed,  Pencavel  concludes  that  most  studies  find  a  greater 
weight  attached  to  employment  compared  with  what  rent  maximization  would 
imply. 
The  size  of  p,  the  parameter  which  weights  the  utility  function  of  the  union  in D. de lu  Croix  et al. /  Europenr~ Economic  Rerirw  40 (19%)  429-448  441 
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the  objective  function  (i.e.,  which  converts  profits  into  utility),  though  significant, 
varies  considerably  across  countries  and  seems  to  be  very  high  for  the  Nether- 
lands.  However,  a cross-country  comparison  of  p  is  not  very  insightful,  since  it’s 
estimates  depend  on  the  scale  of  profits. 
The  estimation  of  6,  V,  1(c)  and  U,  allows  to  compute  the  mark-up  of  wages 
over  the  reservation  wage  (including  past  wages).  As  the  results  in  Table  2  show, 
this  mark-up  gives  a  good  idea  of  the  evolution  of  the  union  rent  through  time. 
This  rent  is  steadily  declining  for  France  and  Belgium,  while  for  the  Netherlands. 
it jumped  near  0  in  the  mid  seventies  and  tends  to  remain  very  low  since  then. 
We  also  report  in  Table  1  the  NLS  estimates  of  the  MA(  1)  process  of  the 
disturbances  associated  with  the  Euler  equations: 
For  the  three  countries,  the  p  coefficients  are  significant,  a  finding  which  is  in 
accordance  with  the  assumptions  underlying  the  model. 
In  Table  3,  Ljung-Box  autocorrelation  tests  (of  order  4  for  France  and  the 
Netherlands  and  of  order  2  for  Belgium)  reveal  that  the  residuals  5  display  serial 
correlation  in  the  wage  equations  for  France  and  the  Netherlands.  This  apparently 
significant  autocorrelation  is  probably  due  to  the  presence  of  conditional  het- 
eroscedasticity  (see  Fig.  4)  which  we  have  accounted  for  when  implementing 
GMM,  but  not  when  computing  the  Ljung-Box  test. 
Hansen’s  J-test  measures  the  extent  to  which  the  residuals  are  effectively 
orthogonal  to  the  instrument  set.  The  number  of  degrees  of  freedom  equals  the 
number  of  restrictions  imposed  by  the  orthogonality  conditions.  These  restrictions 
are  not  rejected  at  the  5%  level  for  the  three  countries.  Table  3  presents  also  the 
Wald  tests  corresponding  to  three  interesting  special  cases  of  the  model:  risk 
neutral  union  (V =  l),  competitive  labour  market  ( p  =  0)  and  union  interested  in 
wage  growth  only  (4  =  I).  All  these  hypotheses  are  strongly  rejected  for  the  three 
countries  when  the  Wald  statistic  is  compared  to  the  x’  value  with  one  degree  of 
freedom. 
The  test  0, =  0  that  the  union  has  a  myopic  foresight  behaviour  may  not  be 
carried  out  in  a  standard  way  since  0,  is  not  estimated.  We  could  however 442  D. de  la Croix et al./  European  Economic  Review 40  (1996)  429-448 
Table  3 
The  efficient  contract  model  (tests) 
France  Netherlands  Belgium 
D.W.  (1) 
D.W.  (w) 
1963:1-1991:4  1971:1-1989:4  1953-1988 
2.12  3.04  2.67 
3.20  2.70  2.20 
Ljung-Box  (I)  5.59  4.7  1 
p-value  [O. 131  [0.191 
Ljung-Box  (w)  12.84  10.06 





J-test  20.59 
Degrees  of  freedom  20 
p-value  [0.42] 
20.97  12.35 
26  20 
IO.741  [0.90] 
H,:  v=l  6.55  12.6  47.8 
H,:  p=O  10.7  22.6  96.3 
H,:  c#J=~  17.4  30.3  26.9 
estimate  the  model  imposing  the  restriction  O,V  =  0  and  compare  the  value  of  the 
objective  function  with  the  one  of  the  general  model  with  a priori  chosen  value  for 
0. Note  that  the  assumption  of  myopia  on  the  side  of the  union  does  not  imply  any 
restriction  on  estimated  parameters  with  respect  to  the  above  model  but  changes 
the  structural  form  of  the  wage  equation.  The  estimation  of  such  model  turned  out 
to  be  very  difficult  for  the  Netherlands.  Reliable  estimates  are  obtained  only  for 
France  and  for  Belgium.  The  corresponding  J-tests  are  31.47  and  14.78  respec- 
tively.  Both  are  higher  than  in  the  general  case.  The  overidentifying  restrictions 
are  rejected  for  France  at  the  5%  level  but  are  not  rejected  for  Belgium.  The  fact 
that  the  J-test  is  higher  for  the  same  number  of  degrees  of  freedom  in  both 
countries  is  an  indication  that  the  general  model  performs  better  than  the  myopic 
union  model  for  France  and  for  Belgium.  Also  the  findings  for  France  that  the 
difference  between  the  value  of  the  objective  function  of  GMM  of  the  general 
model  and  that  for  8 =  0  is  substantial  is  another  indication  that  the  model  with 
forward  looking  union  behaviour  is  preferred  to  the  model  assuming  myopia. 
The  residuals  of  the  Euler  equations  are  plotted  in  Figs.  3  and  4.  Concerning 
the  employment  equation,  the  two  productivity  shocks  corresponding  to  the  oil 
shocks  are  perceptible  for  the  three  countries.  We  interpret  the  impact  of  the  oil 
shocks  as  being  temporary  (the  real  price  of  oil  has  now  reverted  to  its  1972  level) 
and  included  in  the  productivity  shock  E,~.  Moreover,  two  other  important  shocks 
appear:  one  in  1982  in  France  (the  sharp  reduction  in  working  hours  decided  by 
the  Mauroy  government)  and  in  1958  in  Belgium  (World  exhibition?).  Concerning 
wage  equations,  the  residuals  seem  to  display  heteroscedasticity  confirming  the 
use  of  heteroscedastic-consistent  estimators  of  the  variance-covariance  matrix  of 
the  orthogonality  conditions.  In  addition,  we  have  verified  that  there  is  no The Netherlands 
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Fig.  3.  Residuals  from  the  employment  equation. 
stochastic  trend  present  in  the  residuals  using  two  tests  proposed  by  Phillips 
(1987)  and  Phillips  and  Ouliaris  (1990)  (&  and  2,).  This  amounts  to  test  whether 
the  I(I)  variables  are  cointegrated  in  a  nonlinear  way  in  the  Euler  equations. 
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Table  4 
Cointegration  tests 
France  Netherlands  Belgium 
Y=l  e=4  /=I  /=I0  /=I  e=4  /=7  P=lO  /=I  e=2 
i  711+  I 
-c  -  117.7  -99.7  -  90.9  -  88.11  -  102.4  -98.0  -  98.7  -  100.0  ~40.44  -  38.05 
2,  -  11.4  -  11.8  -  12.4  -  12.8  -  15.7  -  16.9  -16.6  -  16.3  -  8.0  -  8.4 
7:; I 
z3  -  169.7  -  160.0  -  160.2  -  161.4  -93.5  -88.1  -89.7  ~91.2  -36.4  -33.0 
Z  -21.9  -  25.2  -  25.0  -  24.5  -  12.2  -  12.7  -  12.6  -  12.4  -  6.8  -7.1 
Unfortunately,  the  tables  they  provide  are  only  valid  for  linear  long-run  relation- 
ships,  so  that  they  are  not  applicable  here.  However,  since  there  is  not  much 
known  for  the  nonlinear  case,  we  use  the  critical  values  of  PhilFps  and  Ouliaris 
(1990)  for  indicative  purposes.  These  values  are  -41.9  for  the  Z,  test  and  -4.9 
for  the  Z,  test.  The  results  are  presented  in  Table  4  for  different  truncation  lag 
parameters  (/>.  Both  tests  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  cointegration  at  any 
level  for  France  and  for  the  Netherlands.  For  Belgium,  the  .$  test  rejects  the  null 
hypothesis  of no  cointegration  for  both  equations,  while  the  Z,  test  rejects  the  null 
at  10%  only  for  the  employment  equation  and  does  not  reject  it  for  the  wage 
equation.  7 Globally,  using  these  tests  and  looking  at  Figs.  3  and  4,  there  is  no 
reason  for  not  rejecting  the  absence  of  nonlinear  cointegration  among  the  variables 
and  therefore  for  suspecting  spurious  results.  Notice  that  the  rejection  of  the 
absence  of  cointegration  in  the  employment  equation  is  an  indication  that  the 
technology  shock  E, affecting  marginal  labour  productivity  has  been  stationary. 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  estimate  of  p  in  the  efficient  contract  model  is 
significant,  we  estimate  the  neo-classical  model  (with  the  same  set  of  instruments) 
which  is  of  interest  for  its  own  sake.  The  results  are  presented  in  Table  5. 
The  following  differences  with  the  efficient  contract  model  are  worth  noting: 
The  estimation  of  (A,1 is  always  significantly  lower  in  the  neo-classical  model. 
This  implies  that,  if  the  efficient  bargaining  model  is  appropriate,  an  estimation 
based  on  the  neo-classical  model  underestimates  the  concavity  of  marginal 
productivity  (and  therefore,  the  elasticity  of  employment  to  wages  along  the 
labour  demand  curve). 
The  estimation  of  the  parameters  of  the  adjustment  cost  function  differs 
between  the  two  models  but  these  differences  are  not  statistically  significant. 
This  implies  that  the  introduction  of  additional  dynamics  in  the  employment 
’ The  difference  between  the  two  tests  could  be  due  to  their  small  sample  properties  (the  sample  size 
for  Belgium  is  31). D.  de  la  Croix  et al. /European  Economic  Rm’iew  40  (1996)  429-44X  us 
Table  5 
The  neo-classical  model 
France  Netherlands  Belgium 
D.W. (I) 
D.W. (u.) 
J-test  [p-value] 
1.59  (0.53)  0.68  (0.1.5) 
-  1.37  (0.47)  -  0.28  (0.09) 
0.54  (0.06)  0.43  (0.07) 
-31.10  (3.39)  --  16.07  (1.24) 
284.2  (86.7)  64.20  (14.6) 
1.03  (0.03)  0.99  (0.01) 
0.13  (0.20)  -0.58  (I .OO) 
1.37  (I .04)  2.62  (2.12) 
2.10  2.95 
2.48  2.05 
23.19  LO.391  24.98  [0.63] 
-  0.78  (0. I I) 
0.80  (0.10) 
0.60  (0.02) 
-8.1  I  (0.18) 











equation  through  habit  formation  does  not  significantly  affect  the  estimation  of 
the  adjustment  cost  function. 
*  The  parameter  C$  is  around  one  in  the  neo-classical  model.  This  implies  that  the 
wage  equation  is  reduced  to  the  second  equation  of  (9)  which  is  expressed  in 
terms  of  first  differences  of  net  wages. 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  overidentifying  restrictions  are  not  rejected  for  the 
neoclassical  model,  the  empirical  evidence  favours  the  efficient  bargaining  model 
on  the  basis  of  the  Wald  test  but  also  on  the  basis  of  the  plausibility  of  the  point 
estimates  of  the  parameters. 
4.  Conclusion 
We  have  presented  a dynamic  non-linear  model  of efficient  contracting  between 
a firm  and  a union  interested  in  wages  and  employment.  The  firm  faces  adjustment 
costs  on  labour  and  the  tastes  of  the  union  depend  on  past  wages  through  an  habit 
formation  process.  The  parameters  of  the  Euler  equations  of  this  model  have  been 
estimated  with  generalised  method  of  moments  under  the  assumption  of  rational 
expectations,  imposing  the  overidentified  restrictions  implied  by  the  theoretical 
model.  The  estimation  has  been  carried  out  for  French,  Dutch  and  Belgian  labour 
market  data.  The  estimation  results  turned  out  to  be  remarkably  similar  for  the 
three  countries.  The  findings  have  allowed  us  to  compute  estimates  of  the 
non-linear  adjustment  cost  function,  of  the  union’s  relative  risk  aversion  and  of the 
gap  between  the  contract  wage  and  the  reservation  wage,  which  can  be  interpreted 
using  the  dynamic  theory  on  efficient  contract  and  labour  demand. 
The  model  was  then  estimated  under  two  alternate  assumptions:  6)  a  myopic 446  D.  de  la  Croix  et al./  European  Economic  Review  40  (1996)  429-448 
union  and  (ii)  a  competitive  labour  market.  Although  the  overidentifying  restric- 
tions  implied  by  these  two  cases  are  not  rejected,  the  parameter  estimates  seem 
less  plausible  for  the  competitive  labour  market  than  for  those  of  the  efficient 
contract  model  with  forward-looking  union.  Therefore,  we  conclude  that  inertia  in 
the  adjustment  of employment  and  wages  in  the  three  countries  can  been  explained 
in  terms  of  the  effect  of  habit  formation  by  the  unions  and  asymmetric  adjustment 
costs  faced  by  firms. 
In  view  of  the  similarities  and  the  performance  of  the  efficient  contract  model 
for  three  countries,  the  development  and  the  estimation  of  a dynamic  non-cooper- 
ative  bargaining  set-up  and  the  treatment  of  the  related  time-consistency  problems 
in  the  case  of  labour  adjustment  costs  seems  to  us  a  natural  priority  for  future 
work  in  this  field  of  research. 
Acknowledgements 
We  are  grateful  to the  participants  to  the  SPES  programme  E/89400153/PRO, 
to  the  seminars  in  GREQE,  Carlos  III  (Madrid)  and  Louvain-la-Neuve  and  to 
ESEM  94  in  Maastricht  for  their  helpful  comments.  The  research  in  this  paper  was 
initiated  during  the  stay  of  the  first  author  at  the  University  of  Limburg.  The  first 
author  acknowledges  the  Belgian  programme  on  Interuniversity  Poles  of  attraction 
(Belgian  State,  Prime  Minister’s  office).  The  third  author  acknowledges  the 
financial  support  of  the  Royal  Netherlands  Academy  of  Arts  and  Sciences 
(K.N.A.W.).  Johan  Graafland,  Michel  Lubrano  and  Fatemeh  Shadman-Mehta 
kindly  made  their  data  available  to  us. 
Appendix  A.  Data  sources  and  definitions 
A.1.  General  comments 
The  variable  k  is  always  measured  as  the  capital  stock  times  the  degree  of 
utilisation  of  capacities  (due).  Additional  variables  used  as  instruments  are  pi/p 
(real  price  of  investment),  pm/p  (real  price  of  imports),  xw  (world  demand),  d 
(union  density),  wg  (wages  in  the  public  sector),  y  (output),  ur  (unemployment 
rate),  h  hours  of  work,  i (nominal  long-term  interest  rate). 
A.2.  Belgium 
Y  (GDP), wn,  WC,  P,  PC, pm,  XW  have  been  taken  from  Mehta  and  Sneessens 
(1990).  p’,  r  (discount  rate),  wa  (unemployment  allowance),  1 (employment  in 
equivalent  full-time)  and  k  have  been  provided  by  the  Central  Planning  Bureau.  d 
has  been  computed  by  Vincent  Vannetelbosch  (Louvain). L?  de  la  Croix  et al. /  European  Economic  Recairw 40  (1996)  429-448  -131 
Instruments  are  a  constant  term,  trend,  Ay_  2,  Al,_  ,.  Ak,_ ,  3 A( P,/P),~  2’ 
Ay,m2,  Ax’_,,  A(p,/p),_,,  z,v_?,  d.,_z,  A$_,,  duc,m  ,,  ~2,  ACz. 
A.3.  France 
y  (GDP),  w”,  wC, p,  pC,  1 (number  of  workers  times  number  of  hours).  k.  p”‘. 
i  and  ur  have  been  taken  from  the  databank  built  under  the  supervision  of  Guy 
Laroque  at  INSEE.  wa  (minimum  wage)  is  a  series  computed  by  Michel  Lubrano 
(Marseille). 
Instruments  are  a  constant  term,  trend,  Aw,‘_,,  Al,_,,  Ak,..,,  A(p,/p),_,. 
A!,,_  4,  Ax:_,,  A(p,/p),~_,,  Awf’_,,  i,_,,  due,_,,  ur,  4,  h,  J. 
A.4.  Netherlands 
.v (industrial  production),  wC, p,  p’,  1, k,  due,  ur  and  h have  been  taken  from 
Pfann  and  Palm  (1993).  wa  (minimum  wage),  d  and  z  from  Graafland  (I 99 I I. 
Instruments  are  a  constant  term,  trend,  ;Iw,~_ ?.  -\w:‘_~,  Al,  , ,  Ak,  , , 
A(p’/p),_z,  Ay,_,,  Aw,f,  A:_,,  Aw,Yz.  i,..,,  due,  ,.  wm2,  h\_,.  :,  ?. 
d \__>‘(p/p’),_2. 
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